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Executive summary 
This report is an attempt to gain a better understanding of public attitudes towards European 
integration by relating general and specific developments in societal values and expectations to 
underlying socio-economic trends. The analytical point of departure is the thesis that European 
values are gradually transformed as societies reach advanced stages of industrialisation and take 
on post-modem traits. As opposed to 'modem' society, 'post-modem' society is characterised 
by a popular emphasis on democratic political institutions and individual freedom, a 
diminishing prestige of science, technology, and rationality, and a rejection of traditional, 
bureaucratic, and hierarchical authorities. In view of this development, the report: ( 1) Traces 
general changes in European values; (2) Analyses the transformation in socio-economic 
structures, European value patterns, and attitudes towards European integration, based on an 
analysis of societal change and a grouping of the member states in a number of sufficiently 
distinct clusters, and; (3) Considers possible consequences for the European integration process. 
General value changes in European societies: 
Traditional values - marked by respect for established authorities, a hierarchical picture of 
society, and subordination of the individual to the group - show a general decline to the benefit 
of universal individualis·m. To a higher degree than before, European citizens subscribe to 
values such as the primacy of the needs, desires and wills of individuals, and the questioning of 
traditional centres of power and authority. 
• This gradual shift from traditional values towards post-modem, individualist values 
characterises the attitudes of European citizens in all areas of life - work, family, politics 
and religion. 
• While this general trend is shared by all EU member states, the gap remains between the 
more traditional societies in southern Europe and the more post-modem societies in 
northern Europe, although a significant progress can be detected in the former. 
• The replacement of generations is the primary source of this development from traditional 
values towards post-modern and individualist values. Each generation is less traditional 
and more post-modern than the preceding, a fact which suggests a long-term structural 
trend. 
• The general development of European value patterns towards a higher incidence of 
universal individualism and post-modern values, does not imply that all social groups 
react in the same way to changing socio-economic structures. Rather, the transformation 
of socio-economic structures enhances the possibilities of some societal groups, while 
challenging the es~ablished ways of life of others. This translates into a value system of 
some heterogeneity and contradiction, where post-modern and modern value patterns 
coexist. 
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Changing values and attitudes to European integration 
Despite the general character of the shift in societal values, important national differences 
persist in the socio-economic structures of the member states, the values embraced by the 
societies, and the respective attitudes towards European integration. In an attempt to isolate the 
differences among different EU member states without performing a state-by-state analysis, the 
report groups the member states in a number of sufficiently distinct clusters. 
• A very sceptical North: Denmark, Sweden, and Finland form the most homogenous 
clusters in the EU, with comparable levels of economic development and social welfare, similar 
socio-cultural profiles, a high propensity of post-material values, and a shared hostility towards 
European integration. The Danes, the Swedes, and the Finns are the European peoples feeling 
the least European, and the Nordic countries score the highest for instance in their 
misconception of the uses of the EU budget. The Swedish population is the most negative to 
European integration and the EU as such, while the Danes favour economic integration but 
disapprove of political, and the Finns seem less categorically opposed to the EU than other 
Nordic citizens. 
• The Benelux countries and France: While the Benelux countries and France display 
similar economic profiles (above the EU average in terms of economic development), social and 
attitudinal indicators would place Luxembourg among the more traditional countries, Belgium 
and France slightly above the EU average in terms of post-material values, and the Netherlands 
in the post-modem camp of the Scandinavian countries. In all four states, citizens feel markedly 
more European and are more positively disposed towards a federal Europe than the average EU 
citizen. Notably, however, the Netherlands and Luxembourg display a distinctly more Euro-
positive profile than Belgium and France with respect to issues such as the support for and 
perceived benefits from EU membership, the anticipated benefits from the Single Market, 
knowledge about the EU, and the visibility of the Community institutions in the media. 
• Germanic Centr~I Europe: In terms of economic development and social and cultural 
patterns, Germany and Austria share many characteristics which set them apart from other EU 
member states. The prevalence of post-modem values in Germany is slightly above the EU 
average, comparable to the level in, for example, France. Despite these similarities, the profiles 
of Germany and Austria differ substantially as regards European integration, with Germany 
being closer to the federalist-friendly position of the other founding members and Austria 
sharing the Euro-sceptic sentiments of the other recent members Sweden and Finland. In view 
of the highly divergent histories of participation in the European integration process, it is 
notable that the populations in both countries feel equally detached from the European Union, 
that they display the same uneasiness in terms of acknowledging a European identity, and that 
·the Germans are the European citizens with the lowest level of confidence in the Community 
institutions. 
• Spain, Portugal, Greece and Ireland (the cohesion countries): Ireland, Spain, 
Portugal, and Greece show a high degree of convergence as far as socio-economic indicators are 
concerned. While economic structures and general societal values are distinctly more traditional 
in these countries than in other EU member states, it is notable that all four, in particular Ireland, 
have experienced striking socio-economic progress in recent years. These countries are, 
however, only just about to enter the first stages of post-modernism, with Spain and Ireland 
leading the way. Support for EU membership has traditionally been high or quite high in aIJ four 
countries - a support, based more on the perceived economic benefits of European integration 
than on a desire to see the European Union develop in a federal direction. The populations in all 
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four countries rate below the EU average in terms of feeling European and of their attachment to 
the EU. 
• Two big countries with opposing positions on European integration: The UK and Italy 
stand out as two countries which cannot easily be grouped with other EU member states, and 
which in many ways also constitute as each other's opposites. In social and economic terms, 
the United Kingdom displays a modem profile. Still, post-material values are slightly less 
prevalent in the UK than in the EU in general. The Euro-scepticism in the UK is only matched 
by the negative attitudes in the Nordic countries and Austria. But while the British remain 
extremely reluctant to transfer new competencies to the European level, they are nevertheless, 
in principle, rather positive towards further political integration. Italy, by contrast, displays a 
rather traditional social profile, though it is situated above the EC average in terms of 
economic development. Even if it has caught up in the last decade, Italy is still among the EU 
member states with the lowest share of the population expressing post-material values. In no 
member state, however, is the support for European integration as firm as in Italy. While 
hesitant as to the economic benefits of membership, Italians are staunch supporters of a 
federal Europe, feel rriore European than any other population, and are the Europeans most in 
favour of a wide-ranging transfer of decision-making powers to the EU level. 
Consequences for European integration 
The results do not permit any simple, clear-cut association between the degree of post-modem 
values in a society and the population's attitude towards European integration. Culture, 
historical experiences and traditions act as a prism through which values are transformed, and 
the process towards post-modem societal values thus effects European societies in different 
ways. Nevertheless, the report attempts to isolate a number of possible consequences that the 
shift towards post-modem values may have for popular attitudes towards the EU and the process 
of integration throughout the Union. 
• The arrival of the post-modem society probably means that the time of permissive 
consensus to European integration among European citizens is over. There is a general 
dissatisfaction with the way in which the democratic system works both on national and 
European level. Popular demands for more participation in the European political system 
are likely to grow louder - a challenge to which the Union will have to respond, or else 
the detachment of European citizens is likely to be further aggravated. 
• Citizens in the post-modem society make other demands on the European Union than 
those of earlier generations, suggesting that new or more recent issues may gain a greater 
prominence on the agenda next to economic matters, which are likely to remain 
important. Given post-modem society's emphasis on security values, the rejection of 
authority, and the diminishing prestige of science, technology, and rationality, greater 
importance may become attached to Community action in fields such as environmental 
protection, the fight against social exclusion, consumer protection and various areas 
linked to soft security. 
• To the extent that the post-modem society raises citizens' demands for democratic 
participation, and contributes to new issues being addressed at the European level, it is 
essential that European citizens share a perception of being able to influence the policy-
formation process in the EU. In a wider context, this is dependent on a general feeling of 
belonging to Europe. The gradual emergence of such an imagined community requires 
efforts both at European and national level. 
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Introduction 
The aim of this report is to gain a deeper understanding of public attitudes towards European 
integration by relating general and specific developments in societal values and expectations to 
underlying socio-economic trends in the 15 EU member states. 
The study has taken as point of departure the thesis that a change of values occurs in a society 
when it reaches the stage of advanced industrialisation and then gradually abandons the virtues 
connected to that particuiar model to become a post-modern society. Change does not, however, 
influence each individual society in the same fashion since historical experience, culture and 
traditions act as a prism through which values are transformed. This report is based on the 
assumption that all EU member states are adopting the characteristics of a post-modern society 
(although with quite substantial differences in their socio-economic development and according 
to specific cultural characteristics). Refraining from drawing any firm conclusion as to the 
interplay between changing values and attitudes to EU, it is the hope that this report may 
stimulate further debate on the possible consequences of societal transformation for public 
support of the process of European integration. 
In an attempt to gain additional insight into the formation of attitudes towards European 
integration in general and the EU in particular, the report analyses the transformation in socio-
economic structures, European value patterns, and attitudes towards European integration. The 
motive behind this exercise is not to show a causal link between the level of post-modernism in 
a given European society and popular attitudes to the EU, as such a conclusion would be highly 
hazardous and uncertain. Rather its merits lie in the attempt to show a number of 'instant 
images' of popular attitudes in different EU member states against the backdrop of changing 
societal values and, on that basis, raise a number of questions related to the possible 
consequences for popular acquiescence to European integration. Some of the challenges posed 
to the integration proces~ by changing societal values are elaborated in the conclusions of this 
report. 
This report is organised as follows: The first section gives the reader an insight into the report's 
analytical framework which is centred on the thesis of the advent of post-modem societies 
forwarded by Professor Ronald Inglehart. The second section describes the patterns of societal 
change among the 15 EU member states. The third section analyses the changing values and 
attitudes to European integration based on five groups of countries (the Nordic group, the 
Benelux countries and France, Germanic central Europe, the cohesion countries and, as a 
separate and heterogeneous group, the UK and Italy). The report draws some conclusions on the 
likely impact of societal change on popular attitudes and expectations on European integration 
and the European Union. 
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1. From a modern to a post-modern society 
The point of departure for this analysis is the article of Professor Ronald Inglehartl which draws 
some general conclusions regarding changes in values versus economic and political progress 
on the basis on the World Values Survey of 1990-91. 2 
• The 'modem' society comprises industrialisation, occupational specialisation, 
bureaucratisation, centralisation, rising education levels and a configuration of beliefs and 
values closely linked with high levels of growth. A society which has reached an advanced level 
of industrial development undergoes a major change, the parameters of which put less emphasis 
on economic growth, but more on the quality of life in general and on democratic political 
institutions in particular - it becomes 'post-modern'. 
• The 'post-modern' society is characterised by (1) a shift from scarcity values to security 
values; (2) a diminishing effectiveness and acceptability of bureaucratic authority; (3) a 
rejection of the West as a model, and the collapse of the socialist alternative; (4) a growing 
emphasis on individual freedom and emotional experience, and rejection of all forms of 
authority; and (5) a diminishing prestige of science, technology and rationality. 
It has also been possible to prove (according to Professor Inglehart) that coherent cultural 
patterns exist and that these patterns are linked with a given society's level of economic 
development. According to this thesis, socio-economic indicators could be used to place 
different societies on a 'modernisation' axis.3 The indicators singled out by Professor Inglehart 
are: ( 1) the level of secondary or higher education (with 0.47 correlation with modernisation and 
0.63 with postmodernisation); (2) the percentage of the workforce employed in the service 
sector (no correlation with modernisation and 0.57 correlation with postmodernisation); and (3) 
per capita GDP (0.33 and 0.82 correlation respectively). On the other hand, there is a modest 
negative correlation between post-modem values and economic growth (which is a major value 
in modern-industrialist societies). Declining birth rates are linked both to modern and post-
modem societies as high fertility is connected to traditional values. As far as political change is 
concerned, this research shows that there is no correlation between the modernisation axis and 
the number of years of democracy in a society. On the other hand, there is an extremely strong 
correlation between post-modem values and democracy as such. The interpretation offered is 
that societies with a strong civil culture (characterised by interpersonal trust, tolerance, 
solidarity, civil engagement, political equality and civil association) have been able to generate 
economic growth and therefore attained a high standard of living (not the other way around!). 
These societies have in tum entered the post-modem era in advance of other societies where the 
inherent civic culture has been less favourable to modernisation. 
I Ronald Jnglehart, 'Changing values, economic development and political change', Revue internationale des 
sciences sociales (English ed.): No. 145, September 1995, pp. 379-403. 
2 There are of course other theses on the importance of changing societal values, for instance the work by Paul. H. 
Ray, The Integral Culture Survey. A Study of Values, Subcultures and the Use of Alternative Health Care in America, 
a report to Fetzer Institute and the Institute of Noetic Sciences, October I 995. 
3 The figure is constructed in such as way that in the right hand comer the modernisation axis y='scarcity values' and 
x='traditional authority' is juxtaposed with the axis in the left-hand comer, y='postmodem values' and 
x='rational-legal authority'. The indicators furthest up in the left-hand comer are those which are most significant for 
a postmodem society. 
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Professor Inglehart's analysis singles out a number of clusters of west European countries on the 
modernisation axis. There is a Nordic cluster (Sweden, Finland, Norway, Denmark and Iceland) 
to which the Netherlands and Switzerland are closely associated. Belgium, Austria, France, 
Italy, Spain and Portugal form another cluster, while (west) Germany places itself closer to the 
rational-legal authority value. The difference between these two principal west European 
clusters is according to Inglehart due to the fact that one cluster is made up by Protestant 
countries, or those which have been strongly influenced by Protestantism, such as the 
Netherlands, while the other cluster is made up by Roman Catholic countries. Britain and 
Canada (and to a certain extent the US) form a cluster of countries with relatively strong 
security values, but with higher religious-traditional values than many other countries on their 
economic level. Ireland falls in the same category but with stronger scarcity values because of 
its relatively less advanced economy (at the time of the study, i.e. 1990-91 ) . 
For the purpose of analysing attitudes to European integration, it is interesting to note the move 
towards post-modem values in advanced industrialist societies. This change is taking place in 
close corroboration with the replacement of generations. Socio-economic indicators (see above) 
which give a diagnosis of the state of development of a country may in part also predict a shift 
in values. lnglehart found, however, a strong influence of culture in the process of change as 
coherent cultural patterns were strongly linked to economic development and even more to the 
presence of stable democratic societies. 
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2. Societal change in Europe 
On the basis of Inglehart's socio-economic indicators (higher education, percentage of people 
employed in the service sector and per capita GDP), a short analysis of statistical series 
pertaining to the 15 EU member states follows hereunder which points towards a tendency 
towards a general advancement in all EU member states. 
Despite some considerable differences among the member states (Belgium has with 98% the 
highest percentage of 16-18-year-olds enrolled in education or training, while Portugal has the 
lowest with 65% ), poorer member states (Greece, Spain and Portugal) have in general increased 
the rate of students in university by three between 1975-94, while in other member states the 
students have doubled (or almost).4 
The same phenomenon of a relative convergence is observable in the increasing percentage of 
people employed in the service sector (tables 15-18). The member states with the highest 
proportion of the workforce employed in the agriculture sector in 1994 (Greece 21 %, Ireland 
13%, Portugal 12% and Spain 10%), had not surprisingly fewer people employed in the service 
sector than other member states (ranging from 56% for Greece and Portugal to Sweden with 
73% of the workforce). The increase in the share of the population employed in the service 
sector, however, was as significant (in relative terms more significant) in the countries with a 
considerable agricultural sector as in those with a small part of the population employed in 
agriculture. Furthermore, behind such statistical analysis may hide deep socio-economic change, 
such as the rapid ageing of the Greek agricultural population. 
On a comparative basis, GDP PPS per capita has experienced a convergence of sorts, but which 
has not been of an homogeneous nature. Ireland has caught up significantly compared with the 
European average (EU=lOO), reaching 93.8 points in 1996, up from 74.6 in 1991, Spain, for 
instance, has slid back reaching 76.7 in 1996 compared to 79.3 in 1991. Portugal and Greece 
have improved their rating on the EU index between 1991-1994 with a couple of points. Among 
the richer member states, some like Luxembourg have forged ahead from an already privileged 
top position as compared to the EU average (from 152.2 in 1991 to 165.8 in 1996).5 
On the basis of this brief analysis, we may deduce that all 15 member states are advanced 
industrial societies with the reservation that some of them are still in the process of catching up. 
According to the Inglehart thesis, we may therefore expect that the member states' societies are 
progressively adopting 'post-modem' values with the poorer member states undergoing the 
most rapid change while others have been living in a situation of changing values for some time. 
The brief analysis based on Inglehart' s three principal indicators of socio-economic change 
would gain, however, from being deepened in order to analyse the nature of societal progress 
towards post-modernism among the 15 EU member states. Such a deepened analysis would be 
especially valuable given Inglehart's emphasis on the importance of history, culture and 
traditions in a given society's adaptation to societal change. We should therefore expect that 
societal change takes different expressions in the EU member states. 
4 European Commission, Eurostat, Basic statistics of the European Union, 33n.1 edition, 1996. Tab les 13· 14 in 
appendix. 
5 European Commission, DGII, European Economy: 1996 Broad Economic Policy Guidelines, no. 62, 1996. 
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In terms of demography and family structure, the birth rate indicator points towards a 
generalised decline to a (very low) European average of 1.48 children per woman in 1992. This 
trend should be nuanced to the effect that Nordic member states, which were among the first to 
experience a decline, have recently experienced a rise in birth rates (to 2.09 children per woman 
in Sweden).6 The decline in birth rates in the southern European member states is more recent, 
and in relative terms stronger, but since high fertility rates (according to Inglehart) are linked to 
traditional societies, declining birth rates is no clear indicator for post-modernism. Another 
generalised trend throughout Europe is the increase in age of first-time mothers (table 5). 
Germany and the Netherlands are the two member states with the 'oldest' first-time mothers (at 
an average age of over 28 years). Portugal and Austria are characteri 
sed by a relative low mean age of first-time mothers at about 25 years. Italy and Spain place 
themselves somewhere in the middle of the European spectrum, while the UK is the only 
member state with a decline in the mean age of first-time mothers is registered over more than 
one year. Concerning the rate of abortion (table 6), the picture looks a bit different since in 
many countries with quite high rates since the 1970s, the trend is declining (Sweden, Denmark, 
France, Italy and Finland), while only in those countries with a low initial rate, the trend is 
pointing slightly upwards (Greece and Spain - no data for Ireland and Portugal). 
Turning to the rate of marriage (table 7 and 8, and Social Portrait of Europe), there is a clear 
difference between the Northern European countries where people get married to a lesser extent 
than in all other areas of the Union. The trend, however, seems to point at a convergence of sort 
as the Nordic countries and the Netherlands are experiencing a significant slower decline, or 
even and upturn in the rate of marriage (the Netherlands and Denmark), while other European 
member states are experiencing a recent but significant fall in the marriage frequency. 
The indicator on the rate of marriage is reflected in the indicator on children born outside 
marriage (table 4) where Sweden occupies an atypical position with two-thirds of aJI children 
being born outside marriage, followed by Denmark, France, the UK and Finland (ranging 
between 50% to less than 33% ). Austria, Ireland and Portugal are placed just above or slightly 
below the EU average of 23.3 %, while Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg and 
Spain form another cluster with a rate of children born outside marriage of 10-16%, while Italy 
(8%) and Greece (3%) have by far the lowest rates. 
The rates of marriage and of children born outside marriage are interesting to compare with the 
household composition in the EU member states (table 2). The Nordic countries (Denmark, 
Finland and Sweden), together with Germany, are the member states with the highest proportion 
of one-person households - a category which rates higher than any other type of households in 
these countries. In all other member states, the dominating household type is the traditional 
family (couples with children). The proportion of this household type is particularly strong in 
the southern European countries (Spain, Portugal, Greece and Italy) and Ireland (ranging 
between 53.3% in Spain to 46.7% in Italy). Another cluster of the traditional family household 
is revolving around the EU-average of 37 .3% where we find Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, Austria and the UK. Contrary to an often held belief that the Nordic countries, with 
their lower proportion of traditional family households and higher than average rate of children 
born outside marriage, would have a corresponding over-representation of lone-parent 
household is not substant_iated by the statistical indicators. In the Nordic countries and Germany, 
6 European Commission, Eurostat, Social Portrait of Europe, OPEC, 1996. 
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the rate of lone-parent households is by far the lowest among the EU member states. The 
explanation why the traditional family structure is no longer the most typical household 
composition in the Nordic countries can be found in a combination of a higher-than-average 
proportion of couples without children and one-person households. The proportion of lone-
parent households is the highest in Ireland, the UK and Belgium, followed by Italy, Austria and 
Spain. It is also interesting to note that one-person households are especially rare in Greece and 
Portugal, and that Portugal and Spain have the lowest proportion of couples without children. 
There is a generalised trend among the EU member states of a declining proportion of the 
household income (table 9) being spent on food, indicating a general improvement in the 
standard of living. The decline is spectacular in Portugal and Greece, where the part of the 
income spent on food has decreased from approximately 33% in 1985 to 23.6% in 1991 for 
Portugal and 28.3% in 1993 for Greece. These two countries are, however, still well above the 
EU-average of 14.6% of the household income spent on food. Luxembourg, the UK, the 
Netherlands and Germany fall below the EU-average at around 10% of the income spent on 
food. 
The statistical analysis (see appendix) isolates three distinct clusters and two atypical countries 
concerning the consumption pattern in the EU (Austria, Sweden and Finland not included). The 
first, and most coherent, cluster is made up by Belgium, Denmark, France and Luxembourg. 
The second cluster is composed by the southern European countries, Portugal, Greece, Spain 
and Italy, of which the consumption pattern of Portugal is the most atypical within this group. 
The third is a quite heterogeneous cluster formed around the UK and Ireland, while the 
Netherlands and Germany each have such an atypical consumption pattern that they did not fit 
with any other clusters (neither did they form one between themselves). 
Lastly, the number of telephone lines in operation per l 00 inhabitants (table 19) has experienced 
a general increase between 1980 and 1994. Sweden (68) and Denmark (60) have by far the most 
telephone lines per capita, far above the EU-average of 47 in 1994. Finland, Luxembourg, 
France and the Netherlands form a group situated above the EU-average, while Greece, the UK, 
Germany, Belgium and Austria hover just above or just below the EU-average. Spain, Portugal, 
Ireland and Italy are well below the EU-average, in particular the first three countries show a 
low frequency in that the number of main telephone lines per 100 inhabitant is only about half 
that of Sweden. This pattern is repeated concerning the number of personal computers per 100 
inhabitants (table 20), where again Denmark and Sweden stand out as European champions with 
21 and 19 computers, compared to the EU-average of 11 computers per 100 inhabitants in 1994. 
The increase in the number of personal computers has been quite strong throughout the EU 
member states, with the exception of Greece (3) and Portugal (3.5), the member states with the 
lowest frequency of personal computers. This indicator, although pointing towards a general 
increase in the number of personal computer in the populations throughout Europe, shows an 
atypical tendency in that the rise has been the fastest where the initial situation was already quite 
strong, while the increase has been slower in the countries with a weak initial position. 
This short analysis has showed a strong converging trend concerning economic development 
and associated societal change. Despite this similar underlying trend, important national 
differences persist among the EU member. Furthermore, an advanced level of economic 
development combined with high living standards is not synonymous with post-modem values. 
We observe already on the basis on this quite restricted analysis that the EU member states 
follow a pattern of change determined by their national specificity rather than any 'set' law of 
change. Such an observation is in line with Inglehart' s emphasis on the importance of historical 
experience, culture and traditions in a given country's transition into post-modernism. It should 
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also serve as a warning against expecting a sort of automatic adaptation to post-modem values, 
or a determined formulation of expression of societal change. 
In the process of societal change in the EU, we observe the following trends of change: ( 1) there 
is still a considerable difference between the Nordic and the southern European countries, where 
the former are showing some quite distinct post-modem traits, while the latter still have a more 
traditional expression of society. On the other hand, the Nordic societies seem to have reached a 
sort of plateau in their post-moderness in that the trend for many indicators is slowing or even 
sometimes reversing. The Nordic countries have a distinct household composition which is still 
atypical for the rest of the Union, although a country like Germany is adopting a very similar 
structure of family versus non-family households. Furthermore, the Nordic countries are 
progressing faster than other EU member states in terrils of the degree of computerisation of 
households or private persons. (2) The societies of southern Europe and Ireland are probably 
changing more rapidly than any other member states, a fact in line with the general trend of 
economic convergence. Rapid societal change gives rise to a heterogeneous pattern of post-
modem expression as measured by socio-economic indicators. The traditional family is still the 
most frequent household type, but at the same time, the rate of lone-parent households is among 
the highest in the Union. The proportion of one-person households, on the other hand, is among 
the least frequent. (3) All other member states, despite the advanced economic development and 
high standard of living,· give proof of a mixed picture, sometimes with indicators of post-
modemism higher than in the Nordic countries, sometimes more traditional than in the southern 
European countries. Furthermore, there is no clear distinction between the countries _as the post-
moderness of a given country depends entirely on the indicator looked at. However, some 
striking examples may be mentioned. Luxembourg with the highest per capita GDP in the 
Union and with a high proportion of the ·workforce employed in the service sector is still a 
country with quite traditional societal structure. Germany seems torn between enter a full 
transition into post-modem society and keep to its quite traditional societal structures. The 
Dutch society has some striking post-modem traits, but again in some dimensions (like the 
household composition) remain fairly traditional. 
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3. Changing values in European societies 
The value systems of European societies are undergoing a well-documented change. Based on a 
comprehensive comparis?n of European values in 1981 and 1990,7 a number of trends may be 
isolated, most notably a decline in traditional values and a strengthening of universal 
individualism. 
Traditional values - marked by respect for established authorities, a hierarchical picture of 
society, and a subordination of the individual to the group - show a general decline to the benefit 
of universal individualism. To a higher degree than before, European citizens subscribe to 
individualist values such as the primacy of the needs, desires, and wills of individuals, and the 
questioning of traditional centres of power and authority. But, rather than individualist in the 
egoistic sense, these values are universal, i.e. they emphasise and accept individuals' freedom of 
choice and the equal rights and value of all human beings. This gradual shift from traditional 
values towards post-modem, individualist values characterises the attitudes of European citizens 
irrespective of whether the issue in question is work, family, politics or religion. 
To a greater extent than before, the importance of work goes beyond the mere earning of one's 
living. Rather, work is less of an obligation and more intimately connected with social identity 
and belonging, one's picture of oneself, and self-actualisation. Increasingly, people also value 
independent or participatory decision-making, questioning the logic of orders and hierarchical 
work structures. 
European values concerning the family are also undergoing change, with Europeans generally 
becoming more tolerant ~nd accepting with respect to non-traditional family behaviour. While 
there is still a gap in actual behaviour between northern and southern Europe, the values of 
European citizens tend to converge on a greater tolerance towards social behaviour beyond the 
traditional family concept, such as living together outside marriage, having children outside 
marriage, divorces·, and homosexuality. 
Contrary to what is sometimes argued, Europeans are not becoming less interested in politics 
per se. Rather, to a higher degree than earlier, Europeans tend to prefer active and direct 
political participation through, for example, petitions and manifestations, instead of traditional 
and institutionalised forms of political participation, such as elections, parties, and trade unions. 
Finally, with respect to religion, there is a marked process in Europe towards people becoming 
less religious in general and less practising in their Christian faith in particular. Europe is slowly 
entering a post-Christian stage, both in the sense that Christian religious identity is less 
pronounced than before, and that Europeans, to the extent that they seek spiritual guidance, 
increasingly turn to alternative and parallel forms of spirituality. 
This general trend from traditional values towards post-modem, individualist values, is shared 
by all European societies. But, while the values of Europeans indeed move in the same 
direction, the well-known gap between the north and the south tends to persist. Citizens of 
northern European countries are more tolerant towards and more inclined to engage in non-
7 Futurib/e, 'L'evolution des valeurs des Europeens', numero special 200, 1995; FSU Gilles Bertrand, fiche de 
lecture 
no. 961205. 
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traditional family behaviour. Likewise, Protestant countries tend to be less religious than 
Catholic. It may thus be concluded that European values develop in the same direction, but that 
values in southern Europe largely correspond to those of northern Europe ten years earlier. 
The replacement of generations is the primary source of this development from traditional 
values towards post-modem and individualist values. Each generation is less traditional and 
more modem than the proceeding. In fact, every age group is more individualist in orientation in 
1990 than in 1981, suggesting a long term, structural trend towards individualist and post-
modern values. 
While indeed the European Values Study points to a general development of European value 
patterns towards a higher incidence of universal individualism and post-modern values, this is 
not to say that all citizens within a given society react in the same way to changing socio-
economic structures. Rather, individuals' adherence to post-modern values also depends on 
factors such as age (already established above) and social group, as well as the way socio-
economic changes affect their immediate situation. The transformation of socio-economic 
structures enhances the possibilities of some societal groups, while challenging the established 
ways of life of others. This differentiated impact of socio-economic changes on the population 
at large, translates into a value system of some heterogeneity, although within the general 
development towards post-modern values. 
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4. Changing values and attitudes to European 
integration• 
The European Values study makes it possible to trace the tendencies of change in Western 
Europe. They show a marked shift from a belief in traditional structures, be it religion, political 
institutions, the family or other, towards a stronger emphasis on the individual and his place in 
the community. In other words, there seems to be a general questioning of the traditional 
structures in many EU member states. 
The situation, however, is much more complex than a simple rejection of old ways, traditions 
and institutions. The advanced industrial society with its emphasis on knowledge, agility and 
personal initiative to overcome uncertainty generated by rapid change, is bound to change also 
the fabric of society and the individual's place within it. The individual citizens respond in 
different ways to socio-economic and political changes taking place around them, but within a 
given society, the weight of culture and history should generate a recognisable pattern and 
attitudes should be forming along these patterns. 
In the following section, popular attitudes to European integration in the 15 EU member states 
are analysed. The analysis is based on the assumption that member states are undergoing a 
process of value change, driven by economic progress and societal transformation. The change 
of values is expressed in different ways partly depending on the individual countries' socio-
economic advancement .and partly on their cultural specificity. The EU member states are 
grouped together in four rather homogeneous groups. Group number five, however, is 
composed by two countries that in many ways are each other's opposites, but which also show 
significantly different characteristics compared to other member states. It is, of course, always 
hazardous to group countries, all of them showing distinct national traits, but the aim of this 
report is to illustrate areas within the EU which do represent a recognisable pattern of socio-
economic change, societal values and/or attitudes to the EU. 
An alternative would have been to base the analysis on differences between regions rather than 
countries, since many member states are characterised by great inter-regional differences in 
socio-economic development and societal values. To the extent that reliable and accessible data 
exists, however, it indicates that a division according to regions does not depart significantly 
from the general attitudinal patterns of a country. For example, the only countries with regions 
negative towards EU membership are those which appear as Eurosceptic also in the aggregate, 
.i.e. Sweden, Finland, and Austria. In all other member states, all regions display a majority in 
favour of EU membership, though of course there are regional variations in the size of this 
majority. 
The transformation of socio-economic structures implies a differentiated impact on the 
population as a whole translating into sometimes contradictory or even opposing value patterns. 
The fact that different groups in society react differently to a changing societal environment is 
bound to have an impact ·on the formation of attitudes towards the EU and European integration 
8 Eurobarometer Trends 1974-1994, European Commission, DGX, November 1994; Eurobarometer, no. 44, spring 
1996; Eurobarometer, no. 45, spring 1996; Eurobarometer, no. 46, autumn, 1996, idem; Eurostat, Social Portrait of 
Europe, 1996, OPEC; Futurible, no. 200; idem. European Commission, DGX, EU membership support and 
unemployment rate 1983-96, 1997. Appendix of this report. 
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as such. This is illustrated by, for example, the difference between various occupational groups 
in the support for Union membership. Self-employed, managers, and white collar workers are 
distinctly more positive towards Union membership than manual workers, house persons, and 
unemployed. Likewise, the first three groups, better positioned to enjoy their rights as European 
citizens, also attach greater importance to the right to live, work, study, invest, and vote in other 
European countries. The contradictory nature of European value patterns is illustrated by the 
simultaneous coexistence of post-modern and modern values. For example, European citizens, 
in a post-modern fashion, designate equal treatment regardless of gender, protection of health 
and safety at work, and equal treatment regardless of nationality, as the top priorities of 
European action in the near future. At the same time, however, the most prominent fears of 
European citizens are often clearly modem: more taxes, deeper economic crisis, loss of small 
farms, loss of small/mid-sized enterprises, etc. These patterns suggest that we should interpret 
the development towards more post-modem values as a general trend, which does not preclude 
the existence of heterogeneous, contradictory, and overlapping expressions of values. 
4.1. A very sceptical North 
The three member states of Northern Europe (Denmark, Sweden and Finland) are often 
regarded as among those furthest advanced along the road towards a highly evolved industrial 
economy. Social indicators, like the number of children born outside marriage, the abortion rate, 
the rate of marriages, and household composition, place Denmark, Sweden and Finland in a 
cluster apart from other EU member states (e.g., in Sweden two children out of three are born 
outside marriage). In relation to indicators of economic development, Denmark, Sweden and 
Finland join other member states in the group of countries with the highest GDP per capita and 
number of people employed in the service sector. While the statistical indicators show no 
special position of the Nordic countries regarding consumption (Denmark had in fact a 
consumption pattern very similar to that of Belgium, Luxembourg and France), indicators for 
main telephone lines and personal computers per household put them well in advance compared 
to other member states. 
Surveys show that the Nordic societies are among the most advanced concerning values 
considered as post-modem. This is clear from the European Values Study where 73% of all 
Danes in 1990 expressed their preference for post-modem values (desire to participate in the 
democratic process, freedom of expression, fighting for social rights etc.) as compared to an EU 
average of 68% (Sweden and Finland not included). Comparisons over time show that 
Denmark, which in 1981 had the highest level par excellence, has stabilised at a high level of 
adherence to post-material values, while other European countries have caught up and in some 
cases even overtaken Denmark between 1981 and 1990. Denmark is characterised by a high 
level of inter-personal trust (98% say they trust their countrymen) while two-thirds of the Danes 
express great satisfaction with their life (compared to merely 4% among the Portuguese). 
Together those who are very satisfied of fairly satisfied represent 96% of the Danish society! 
Danes are also much more interested in politics than the EU average (both in general and 
specific EU politics) and express satisfaction with their national democratic system (82% of the 
Danish population said they were very satisfied/quite satisfied with the national democratic 
institutions compared to an EU average of 49%). 
Finns and Swedes consider their countrymen trustworthy (98% and 88%) and Sweden is the 
most trusted nation by other Europeans (67% consider Swedes trustworthy compared to the 
Greeks 43% ). The Finns and Swedes are, however, significantly less satisfied with their lives 
than the Danes (27% and 35% respectively are very satisfied) and place much less trust in their 
national democratic institutions than the Danes: the Finns express a slight mistrust of their 
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national government (46% trust and 48% mistrust), but trust their national parliament (55% trust 
39% mistrust). The same pattern is repeated for Sweden 40% trust and 46% mistrust in the 
government and 47% trust and 41 % mistrust in the parliament. 
The Nordic countries, often grouped together due to a comparable level of economic 
development, similar social welfare profiles and from the outside-looking similar cultural 
characteristics, show a marked hostility towards European integration. The nature of their 
hostility is, however, quite different and worthwhile to investigate further. 
In Denmark, the public attitude towards the EU is dependent on which dimension of integration 
is at stake. On the side of economic/functional integration, it is clear: The Danes support EU 
membership and think that their country has benefited from being a member on a level at or 
above the EU average. In a future perspective, the Danes are rather (52%) or very hopeful (8%) 
that the Single Market will bring benefits - slightly above the EU average - and they have no 
special desire to leave the EU. On the side of political integration or deepened integration, the 
picture is different: The Danes see no need for a European government in the building of Europe 
(13% of the population are in favour as compared to the Italians who are to 70% in favour). 
They are not in favour of transferring competencies to the EU in social, political, monetary, 
security, internal affairs or culture. Only in areas related to the protection of the environment, 
development policies, S&T, fight against drugs and external trade the Danes are in favour of EU 
decision-making. Denmark is the member state that is clearly the most opposed to a federal 
European Union (54% of the Danes are unfavourable which is double t~e score of that of 
Sweden and Finland which are the second two most negatively disposed member states). It 
hardly comes as a surprise that the Danes, the Swedes and the Finns end up at the bottom of the 
list in terms of feeling European (7%, 6% and 4% respectively). 
The attitudes towards the EU of Finns and Swedes are quite similar to that of the Danes with 
some important differences. The Finnish population seems less categorically opposed to the 
extension of powers to European institutions and, although they are charged with a negative 
reputation in Finland, their image is not as negative as in Denmark or in Sweden. The Finnish 
people (57%) would vote to stay in the EU were there a referendum on Finland's EU 
membership. The Swedish population, on the other hand, stands out as the most negative to 
European integration and the EU as such. Not only do the Swedes think that their country is not 
benefiting from being a member (54%, with only 18% who think the country has benefited), 
they also think EU membership is a bad idea (42% are unfavourable to EU membership 
compared to 29% of the Danes) and would vote against if there were another referendum on the 
issue (49% say they would prefer Sweden to leave). Not surprisingly, Sweden is the only EU 
Member State in which people think there is more to fear (48%) than to gain.(43%) from the 
Single Market. In Finland, people are more optimistic towards the perspective of the Single 
Market as 28% express fears as opposed to 61 % who express hope. On the question of a federal 
European Union, Swedes are rather hesitant than hostile (30% are for while 26% are against) 
and the Finns are quite positive (42% for and 26% against). Knowledge about EU and European 
matters in Sweden and Finland is lower than in Denmark (32%, 39% and 49% respectively) 
while the awareness in the media of the Commission, the ECJ and the Council of Ministers in 
all three countries was the highest among the EU member states (in Sweden, 92 % of the 
population had read or heard something in the media about the Commission). The Nordic 
member states scored the highest in the EU in their (mis)conception about the share of 
Community budget spent on offici~ls, meetings and buildings (ranging between 49-53% of the 
budget compared the real share of 5%). 
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4.2. The Benelux countries and France 
The Benelux countries and France show a number of similar socio-economic characteristics 
while not forgetting that they each make proof of specific features in some areas. Economic 
indicators such as GDP per capita, and numbers of main telephone lines and personal computers 
per 100 inhabitants, show that all four countries are above the EU average in terms of economic 
development. Luxembourg is exceptional, however, in terms of its GDP per capita, which is far 
higher than in any other EU member state. The traditional family structure in these countries is 
still more important in this group than in the Nordic group as the proportion of households 
composed by adults and children is revolving around the EU-average. Lone-parent households 
are, however, above the EU-average in Belgium and Luxembourg while in the Netherlands and 
France, this type of household is represented slightly under or just at the EU level. Luxembourg 
is the member state with the highest proportion of non-nationals (31.8%) of which almost all 
originate from another EU country (29% ). France differs from the other three countries 
concerning, for instance, the rate of children born outside marriage, among the highest in the EU 
with 37.2%, but stiII considerably lower than in Denmark and Sweden. Luxembourg and the 
Netherlands have among the highest proportion of their workforce employed in the service 
sector (together with the UK and Sweden). The Netherlands distinguishes itself from the other 
three in its consumption pattern, probably in part due to the atypically low desire of the Dutch to 
own a car or households equipment such as a dishwasher. Many social and attitudinal indicators, 
however, would put the Netherlands in the post-modem camp of Nordic countries. The Dutch 
seem to be permissive as far as abortion, divorce and homosexuality are concerned and place 
themselves very high on the scale for non-adherence to traditional values. 89%, a higher 
proportion of the population than in any other European country, subscribed to post-material 
values in 1990. This is a dramatic change compared to 1981 when the figure was 46% - also 
above the EU average but far behind Denmark's 75%. On the other hand, the Dutch place more 
importance on civic morality than French or Belgian, but less than the Danes who think that 
civic morality is very important. The Dutch society is characterised by high inter-personal trust 
(second highest in the EU with 94% expressing trust in their fellow countrymen), high rate of 
life satisfaction (very and fairly satisfied amount to 96% of the population). 
While the Netherlands and Luxembourg stand out as the two member states having the most 
trust in national and European political institutions, people in France and Belgium express less 
trust in their national political institutions (government and parliament) than in the European 
Commission or the European Parliament. On the post-modem scale, Belgians and French people 
adopt similar attitudes as far as non-adherence to traditional values is concerned (somewhat 
above the EU average in terms of post-material values, a position they occupied in both 1981 
and 1990) and have the lowest rate of civic morality among the EU member states. The French 
society is characterised by a below-average trust in fellow countrymen (86% expressed trust) 
and a quite low rate of life satisfaction (only 12% of the population were very satisfied while 
62% were fairly satisfied). Belgian trust even less their countrymen (82% expressed trust, third 
lowest in the EU) and a slightly higher rate of life satisfaction than in France (just above the EU 
average with 25% being very satisfied while 62% were fairly satisfied). 
The Benelux countries and France, all being among the original six member states of the EU, 
show a number of similarities as far as their attitudes to European integration are concerned. In 
general terms, citizens in all four member states feel more European and are more positively 
disposed towards a federal Europe than the average European. Luxembourg, France, the 
. Netherlands and Belgium are among the six member states (joined by Italy and Ireland) in 
which the feelings of .European citizenship, rather than national or regional, are the highest, 
reaching a level as high as 25% of the population in Luxembourg (16%, 16% and 15% 
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respectively, in the other three). Likewise, Luxembourg, Belgium and France are, together with 
Italy, the four countries in the EU with the highest share of the population feeling attached to the 
Union (64%, 56% and 49% respectively). The Netherlands diverges substantially from the other 
three with a figure as low as 27% in popular attachment, only surpassed by Sweden and Finland 
in the extent to which citizens feel detached from the European Union. It may also be interesting 
to note that France, as opposed to in the other three, displays a negative relationship between 
support for EU membership and the rate of unemployment. 
The Benelux countries and France share a common profile on the desirability of a development 
of the EU in a federal direction. The citizens in all four states are among the firmest supporters 
of a European government responsible to the European Parliament, with the Netherlands 
standing out as the EU member state most in favour (72%), and Luxembourg, France, and 
Belgium following closely behind (62%, 60% and 57% respectively). Similarly, these four 
countries are all among the seven EU member states most in favour of an evolution towards a 
federal European Union, the Netherlands and Belgium being the most supportive of all (56% 
and 53% respectively), and France and Luxembourg hovering around the EU average of 45% 
for and 15% against a federal EU. Finally, there is a consensus among the citizens of Belgium, 
the Netherlands, Luxembourg and France that those member states which support a 
development towards federalism, e.g. Benelux and France, should be allowed to go on and 
achieve it amongst themselves, even if this would result in a two-speed Europe. Together with 
Germany, these four countries are the member states most supportive of such a d_ifferentiated 
approach to the development of a federal Europe. The Benelux countries and France are also 
markedly positive as regards the transfer of competencies to the European level. Of all issues -
including such questions as defence, currency and immigration policy - there are only five 
where the Benelux and France (and indeed the average European) would prefer policy to be 
decided on the national level: health and social welfare, basic rules for broadcasting and press, 
workers' rights, education, and cultural policy. The one exception is Luxembourg's stance on 
VAT rates, where it is one of the few countries to advocate national level decision-making. 
There are, however, a number of significant cleavages also in the values of these four countries. 
Notably, across a number of issues related to European integration, the Netherlands and 
Luxembourg tend to be more positively disposed than France and Belgium, which end up below 
the EC average. At the most general level, the citizens of the Netherlands and Luxembourg 
display a higher level of support for EU membership (75% and 70% respectively) than France 
and Belgium (48% and 42%). Not surprisingly, the same pattern also holds true for the 
questions of whether the member state concerned has benefited from EU membership and how 
the population would vote if a referendum were held on EU membership "tomorrow". But this 
cleavage between the Netherlands and Luxembourg, on the one hand, and Belgium and France, 
on the other, also extends to aspects of European integration beyond the support of EU 
membership. For example, 69% of the population in Luxembourg and 66% in the Netherlands 
consider the European single market a hope rather than a threat, while the corresponding figure 
is 56% and 51 % respectively in Belgium and France. Perhaps more surprisingly, this pattern 
largely extends also to the knowledge about the EU in these four member states, as we1I as the 
awareness of the Community institutions in the media. It is notable that the knowledge and 
media awareness of the EU in France, and to a lesser extent in Belgium, is well below the EU 
average. 
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4.3. Germanic Central Europe 
Germany and Austria constitute, despite notable differences, a third cluster of EU member states 
with certain common socio-economic traits and values which make it worthwhile to group these 
two countries together. In fact, both Germany and Austria often correspond to the EU average, 
and seldom do they exhibit dramatic values at the ends of the European value spectrum. With 
respect to the household composition in Austria, the rates of two parent and one-parent 
households largely conform to the EU average, while in Germany the proportion of one-person 
households is higher than the proportion of households of the traditional family type. On the 
other hand, the frequency of one-parent households is below the EU-average. Germany displays 
markedly more traditional and less post-modem family behaviour than the EU average and (for 
those indicators where values exist) Austria. The abortion rate in Germany is significantly 
below that in, for example, the Nordic countries, France, the UK and Italy. Likewise, the rate of 
children born outside marriage is well below the EU average, and the marriage rate notably 
above the level in all the Nordic countries, France, and the Netherlands. In terms of ethnic 
homogeneity, it should l;le noted that Germany and Austria, together with Belgium, have the 
highest rates in the EU of non-nationals in the population, Luxembourg excluded (8.5% and 
8.8% respectively). 
In economic terms, Germany and Austria display very similar profiles. In some cases, this 
profile corresponds to the EU average, such as in the rates of main telephone lines and personal 
computers per household. In other cases, such as consumption patterns and the relative 
importance of different economic sectors, Germany and Austria form a group of their own. In 
both, the industrial sector employs more people and the service sector less people than in 
Europe in general. Similarly, GDP per capita is among the highest in the Union in both 
Germany and Austria. 
There is a higher predominance of post:-material values in Germany than in the EU in general 
(no value for Austria), with 72% of Germans subscribing to post-material values, comparable to 
the level in France and Denmark. Life-satisfaction in both countries conforms exactly to the EU 
average (81 % of the population claiming to be very or fairly satisfied), and both countries also 
eµjoy a high level of interpersonal trust - not only between the citizens of the same country, but 
also by the citizens of other EU member states. Notable is, however, that in the German case, 
this high level of trust by other Europeans, is also matched by an unusually high level of distrust 
(29% ). Also perhaps somewhat paradoxical, Germans' satisfaction with the way the democratic 
system works remains firmly above the EC average, while interest in politics and trust in 
national and European political institutions is somewhat below. Germans, in fact, are the 
European citizens with the lowest level of confidence in the Community institutions (21 % 
expressing trust in the Commission and 24% in the Parliament). Austrians are also more 
sceptical towards to the Community institutions than the average European, but this, on the 
other hand, is compensated by a high level of trust in the national parliament and government. 
The values in Germany and Austria with respect to European integration both reflect the 
common traits of these countries, as well as the apparent differences, most notably Germany 
being a founding member and Austria a very recent member of the EU. While the general 
support for EU membership is somewhat below the European average in Germany, Austria in 
fact displays the very lowest level of public support (merely 27% of the population considers 
EU membership a "good thing"). A particular feature of the Germans' support for EU 
membership, is the firm inverse relationship to unemployment - the higher the level of 
unemployment, the lower the support for EU membership. In terms of public support for EU 
membership, Austria is thus more similar to other recent member states such as Sweden and 
Finland, than to Germany. The same value pattern is reflected in other like variables, such as the 
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share of the population which perceives the country to have benefited from EU membership, 
and which would vote against membership if a new referendum were held "tomorrow". In view 
of these facts, it is notab!e that Austrians still attach higher hopes to the single market, than, in 
fact, Germans do (55% and 49% respectively considering the single market a hope rather than a 
fear). 
Along the same pattern as that characterising the two countries' attitudes towards EU 
membership, Germans are markedly more positive than Austrians with respect to a development 
of the EU in a federal direction. While Austria, next to the Nordic countries, is highly sceptical 
towards the notion of a federal European Union or the need for a European government in the 
building of Europe, Germany shares the federalist-friendly position of the Benelux-countries. 
Likewise, Germans - like the population of the other five founding members, but in contrast to 
Austria - think that countries in favour of a federal European Union should be allowed to go 
ahead, even if this results in a two-speed Europe. With respect to the transfer of decision-
making competence to the European level, Germans generally correspond to the EU average 
and countries such as the Benelux and France, supporting EU competencies in all fields but 
health and social welfare, basic rules for broadcasting and press, workers' rights, education, and 
cultural policy. Austrians, however, are considerably more protective of national competencies 
and would, in addition, prefer that competencies within defence, currency, immigration policy, 
agriculture and fishing policy, VAT rates, and rules for political asylum, remained or were 
brought back to the national level. 
Despite these differences between Germany and Austria, and the highly divergent histories of 
participation in the European integration process, the populations in both countries feel equalJy 
detached from the European Union (both are below the EU-average with 39 and 36% 
respectively feeling attached to the EU). Similarly, Germans and Austrians are less inclined than 
Europeans in general to consider themselves European rather than national citizens (14% and 
11 % respectively). This uneasiness about European identity is matched, however, by a greater-
than-average knowledge about the EU in both Germany and Austria, the latter only being 
surpassed by Luxembourg. As far as the awareness of the EU in the media is concerned, it is 
slightly higher than the EU average in Austria and marginally lower in Germany, with the 
notable exception of the great visibility of the European Court of Justice in German media. 
4.4. Spain, Portugal, Greece and Ireland (the cohesion countries) 
Although with obvious cultural differences, Ireland, Spain, Portugal and Greece show a high 
degree of convergence as far as socio-economic indicators are concerned. According to these 
indicators the societies of southern Europe and Ireland are only just about to enter the first 
stages of post-modernism, a trend confirmed by the findings of the European Values Study. 
Generally speaking, these countries have experienced marked economic progress in recent 
years, which could lead us to expect a rapid shift towards post-modem values in the close 
future. A change in values is observable for instance in the younger generations living in big 
urban areas. 
The number of children born outside marriage is among the lowest in the EU in Greece (3%) 
and Spain (10% ), while Ireland and Portugal are situated around the EU average of 23% of all 
children being born outside marriage. Equally the abortion rate is the lowest in Greece and 
Spain among the EU countries, and abortion is forbidden in Ireland and Portugal other than for 
medical reasons. With a lower-than-average rate of divorce and with a higher-than-average rate 
of marriage, Spain, Portugal and Greece are among the countries in the EU where one-person-
households are the least frequent, while the traditional household with two adults and children is 
represented well above the European average. In Ireland, where divorce was legally impossible 
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until recently, the household structure is similar as the traditional family structure (two adults 
with children) is strongly represented. The rate of lone-parent households, however, is well 
above the EU average (significantly above that of Portugal and Greece). All four countries have 
a high proportion of the population made up by nationals (97-99% compared to the EU average 
of 95%). 
Spain, Portugal, Greece and Ireland sometimes go under the label "cohesion" countries because 
they have been eligible for financial support from the cohesion fund as a result of the state of 
their economic development (below a 90%-limit of the average EU GDP). Greece, Portugal, and 
Spain are still significantly below the EU average in terms of GDP per capita (the index of 1996 
indicates values of 64.5, 70.4, and 76.7 respectively, with an EU average of 100). Ireland is still 
below the EU average with an index value of 93.8 in 1996, but has caught up significantly since 
1991 (when it was clearly behind Spain, for example). All four countries' pattern of 
employment by sectors is comparatively similar, apart from the employment structure of Greece 
which is atypical also in the broader EU perspective with its heavy preponderance of people 
working in the agricultural sector (21 % in 1994) compared to the EU average and to Spain 
(10%), Portugal (12%) and Ireland (13%). These countries have a slightly larger proportion of 
people working in the industrial sector than the EU-average, but a much lower rate of 
employment in the service sector ranging between 56-59% for Greece, Portugal, Ireland and 
Spain, compared to the EU service champions, such as Sweden (72%) and the Netherlands 
(71 %). In terms of private consumption, the statistical analysis identified a cluster forming 
around the southern member states; Greece, Portugal, Spain and Italy, while Ireland forms a 
quite homogeneous cluster with the UK. Greece, Portugal and Spain place themselves at the 
lower end of the number of personal computers owned by private persons (in Greece less than 
three people per 100 inhabitants have a computer while the corresponding rate is over 21 in 
Denmark), while Ireland places itself slightly above the EU average. Concerning the number of 
telephone lines per 100 inhabitants, Greece reaches the EU average, while the other three 
countries fall quite significantly below (between 34-37 compared to the EU average of over 47). 
The cohesion countries vary considerably as to the rate of post-material values. As opposed to 
Portugal, which has the lowest level of all EU member states with only 36%, the propensities of 
post-material values in Spain (64%) and Ireland (61 %) gradually approach the EU mean of 68% 
(no figures for Greece). In terms of changes over time, it should be noted that Spain in 198 I, as 
opposed to 1990, formed a cluster together with Italy at the lower end of the post-modernity 
scale (no value for Portugal in 1981). The populations of the southern European countries 
express a lower life satisfaction than generally in the EU. Portugal is the country rating the 
lowest with only 4% being very satisfied and 66% being fairly satisfied. Gree~e has the highest 
proportion of people saying they are not satisfied with their lives (39%) compared with 52% of 
the population which feel fairly satisfied. In Spain, more people express satisfaction than in the 
other southern European countries, but the rate of satisfied Spaniards is still below the EU 
average (75% express some kind of satisfaction while 24% are dissatisfied). Irish people on the 
other hand seem to be much more satisfied with their Jives ranking above the EU average with 
90% expressing strong of fairly strong satisfaction. Portuguese and Greeks neither trust their 
fellow countrymen (second and fourth lowest among the EU member states), nor do they enjoy 
the trust of other Europeans (Greeks are the least trusted and the Portuguese are the fourth least 
trusted nationality). In Spain, interpersonal trust is close the EU average (placed between 
Sweden and the UK), while the Spanish enjoy the trust of other Europeans to an extent almost 
comparable to the trust attributed to the French. The Irish case is one of contradiction in that the 
Irish society is characterised by a high level of interpersonal trust, while the Irish people is 
among those least trusted by other Europeans in the EU. 
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In tenns of popular perceived interest in politics, the Portuguese express by far the least interest 
in politics (for instance 45% say they are not at all interested in politics compared to the EU 
average of 20% ). The Spanish follow closely thereafter with 37% of the population expressing 
no interest at all in politics, while close to a third of the population expresses some interest. In 
Greece and Ireland, public interest in politics comes quite close to the EU average as in both 
countries a slightly higher proportion of people express a great deal of interest in politics, 
although slightly more Greeks and Irish express no interest in politics at all compared to the EU 
average. Part of the answer to the southern European member states' disinterest in politics may 
be found in the critical attitude towards the functioning of democracy in their respective 
country. In Greece and Spain, there is a clear trend of increasing dissatisfaction with the way in 
which democracy works. Both countries have experienced a decline in the rate of popular 
satisfaction with democracy from a peak in the mid-80s for Greece and in end of the 80s for 
Spain, to a rate much below EU average in 1994. For instance, in Greece only 28% of the 
population were quite satisfied with the way in which democracy works compared to an EU 
average of 44%, and almost half of the population was not very satisfied compared to 35% as 
the EU-average. In Spain the picture is similar. In 1994 only 30% of the population expressed 
some satisfaction with . the democratic system, while 43% were quite dissatisfied. The 
Portuguese express a rate of satisfaction with their democratic system quite similar to that of the 
EU-average, as 47% (44%) claim to be fairly satisfied while 39% are not very satisfied (35%) 
and 10% (14%) are not satisfied at all. In Ireland, popular satisfaction with democracy is way 
above EU average. In fact as much as 69% of the population claim to be very or fairly satisfied 
a rate which may be compared with the countries with highest popular satisfaction, Denmark 
(82%) and Luxembourg (81 % ). On the question of the public perception of the reliability of 
national and European institutions, the picture looks different. In the case of Greece, the rates of 
reliability of the national government and parliament, as well as those of the Commission and 
the European Parliament, are substantially higher than the EU average. Maybe the difference in 
attitude can be explained by a change in the political leadership between 1994 and 1996 (the 
indicators refer to two different surveys) in the country or quite simply by the two different 
questions being asked. In Spain the rate of reliability of the European institutions is twice that 
attributed to the national counterparts, while in Ireland the positive image of political systems as 
such is reflected in the high rate of perceived reliability (way above the EU average) of both 
national and European institutions. The Portuguese on the other hand are significantly more 
sceptical towards the European institutions (the reliability rate is negative) than to national 
democratic institutions for which the rate of reliability is high. 
Support for EU membership has traditionally been high or quite high in all four countries. In 
1996, Ireland recorded the highest support for EU membership at 75% together with Italy and 
the Netherlands. The three southern European countries also support EU membership but to a 
lesser extent (Greece 51 %, Spain 49% and Portugal 45% ). Often the reasons behind these 
countries' support for remaining a member of the EU has been explained in terms of the 
financial support they receive from the EC structural funds. Such a statement may be 
corroborated by the fact that the Irish, Greeks and Portuguese perceive EU membership as 
beneficial to their countries (86% of the Irish, 68% of the Portuguese, 59% and the Greek and 
40% of the Spanish). On the other hand, support for European integration as such is equally 
popular in these four countries in comparison to the EU average. Another interesting indicator 
of these countries' positive disposition towards the EU is their attitude towards the Single 
Market which is viewed with hope at a higher degree than in many other EU member states. In 
fact, the Irish and the Greeks attach the greatest hope to the Single Market within the whole EU. 
It is also interesting to note that Spain, Portugal and Ireland display a trend of support for EU 
membership which is negatively correlated to the level of unemployment. 
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When considering the indicators measuring the attitudes towards political integration, the 
picture looks quite different. In all four countries, public attitudes towards a federal European 
Union are quite cool in that they all express less support for such an evolution than the EU 
average. Ireland while taking a predominantly supportive view on economic integration is 
almost as negatively predisposed towards a federal Union as Sweden and Denmark. However, 
on the basis of other political indicators such as the need for a European government or the 
transfer of new competencies to the EU level, the four countries once again express general 
support. On the question of a European government, Greece and Ireland express strong support 
(63% and 60% respectively compared to an EU-average of 54% in favour). Spain falls closely 
behind the EU-average in its support ( 50%) while Portugal remains quite hostile ( 41 % in 
favour). On the question of the establishment of a federal Europe even against the will of one or 
two member states, Ireland and Spain are firmly oppose the idea, while Greece and Portugal 
place themselves just around the EU-average. Interestingly, respondents in all four countries 
express a high rate of support for a shift of competence to the EU level in areas such as 
currency, immigration policy, foreign policy and asylum policy. Only on the question of a 
European defence policy the populations' attitudes are diverging as the Greeks, Irish and 
Portuguese remain firmly opposed to the idea while a small majority of the Spaniards is in 
favour of a transfer of defence issues to the European level. 
Concerning the feeling of being European, the Spanish, the Portuguese, the Greeks and the Irish 
feel to a higher degree solely citizens of their own country rather than a citizen of the EU (they 
all rate below the EU-average). Significantly for the southern European countries is the strong 
sense of belonging to a particular region rather than to their country or the EU. This feeling is 
especially strong in Spain (38% as compared to the EU average of 22% who express a strong 
regional belonging), but also in Portugal the regional identity is quite strong (27% ). In Ireland, 
on the other hand, the feeling of being only Irish is the second strongest in the Union after 
Finland, but with the interesting difference that quite a high proportion of the Irish also feel as 
citizens of the EU (16%, equalling the EU-average). The Irish feel to a very low degree a 
regional attachment contrasted with their strong feeling of being Irish. Similarly, in Greece and 
Portugal the populations feel a strong attachment to their respective country which is the highest 
among the EU member states (97% in these countries feel attached to their respective country 
compared to an EU average of 89%). In general, the citizens in Spain, Portugal and Greece have 
a lower-than-average knowledge about EU affairs, while the Irish have a degree of knowledge 
just above the EU average. 
4.5. Two big countries with opposing positions on European 
integration 
The UK and Italy stand out as two countries with the common characteristic that they cannot 
easily be grouped with other EU member states. Moreover, the UK and Italy may in many ways 
- most notably in the attitudes towards European integration - also be described as each other's 
opposites. 
With respect to social i~dicators, the United Kingdom displays a modem and less-traditional 
profile. The UK has among the highest rates of children born outside marriage, 34 out of I 00, as 
compared to the EU average of 23% (but still way below the two-thirds of Swedish children 
born outside marriage). Similarly, the abortion rate in the UK is among the highest in the EU, 
slightly below that of Sweden and Denmark. While the traditional family structure of two adults 
and children is slightly less common in the UK than in the Union as a whole, the UK has among 
the highest rate of lone-parent households in the EU (9% ). The rate of one-person households is 
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close to the EU-average. The proportion of non-nationals in the population (3.5%) is slightly 
below the EU average, and characteristically, the majority of these are non-Europeans. In 
economic terms, the UK largely conforms to the EU average. GDP per capita was marginally 
below the average in the Union in 1996. Likewise, the number of main telephone lines and the 
number of personal computers per I 00 inhabitants lie closely above the EU average. In other 
aspects, the British economy displays distinctly more modern traits. While the proportion of the 
British population employed in the agricultural sector is the lowest in the EU (2.3% ), the share 
employed in services is among the highest (69% ). In terms of consumption patters, the UK 
forms a cluster together with Ireland. 
Post-material values are not as common in Britain as in the Netherlands, Belgium, and the 
Nordic countries, France.or Germany. Rather, the occurrence of post-material values in the UK 
is slightly below the EU average and mirrors the situation in countries like Ireland, Spain, and 
Italy, with 65% of the British subscribing to post-materialism. British citizens are also neither 
more nor less prone to trust each other than the average European (86% expressing trust and 9% 
distrust). 53% of other Europeans express trust for the British, while as many as 39% express 
distrust. Life satisfaction in the UK is above the European average, with 29% considering 
themselves very satisfied and 60% fairly satisfied with the life they lead. The British are also 
more interested in politics than the average European. 13% of all Britons consider themselves 
very interested in politics, while 41 % are interested in politics to some extent (the European 
average is 9 and 34% respectively). This higher-than-average interest in politics is not reflected, 
however, in the satisfaction with and trust in the political system. 5% of the British are very 
satisfied and 46% fairly satisfied with the way democracy works, figures which mirror the 
European average. When asked to express their level of trust in national and European political 
institutions, Britons display a firm distrust of both levels of governance. But while the trust in 
the national parliament and government is just slightly below the European average, the British 
are, with the exception of Germany, the Europeans who express the least trust in the European 
Commission (28% trust and 52% distrust) and the European Parliament (29% trust and 52% 
distrust). 
This highly distrustful attitude towards the European Union is reflected in close to all indicators 
m~asuring values with respect to European integration. The Euro-scepticism in the UK is only 
matched by the negative attitudes in the Nordic countries and Austria. At the most fundamental 
level, support for European Union membership places the UK between Finland and Sweden, 
with 35% of the population considering EU membership a good thing and 26% a bad thing. 
Similarly, only 38% of the British judge that the UK has benefited from EU membership 
compared to 43% who assess the net-benefit to be negative. But for Sweden, the UK is also the 
Member State which approaches the single European market with the most fear and the least 
hope. Not surprisingly, these attitudes place the British among the Nordics and the Austrians on 
the question of how they would vote if a referendum on the EU were held "tomorrow" (52% to 
stay and 30% to leave). 
The British are somewhat less sceptical with respect to political integration in the EU. Attitudes 
towards the desirability of a federal European Union place the UK on the EU average, with 45% 
being for and 19% against. While below the European average, a majority of Britons also think 
that a federal European Union should be established by those countries that so desire, even if 
this would entail a two-speed Europe. Likewise, on the question of whether there is a need for 
an elected European government in the further building of Europe, a majority of the British 
answer in the affirmative (even if the figures are markedly below the European average). The 
British are, however, extremely reluctant to transfer decision-making power to the EU level. 
Apart from those areas where the average European would prefer national solutions, the British 
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also desire to keep decision-making competencies at the national level in the following areas: 
defence, currency, immigration policy, fight against unemployment, agriculture and fishing 
policy, VAT rates, and rules for political asylum. In terms of European identity, the British 
display a complex relationship. Even if the British feel as European as the Belgians, with 15% 
of the population considering themselves citizens of the EU rather than of the UK or of the 
region, the British feel anything but attached to the European Union. Only 30% of Britons 
declare themselves "attached to the EU", compared to 68% "not attached", thus placing the UK 
behind Austria and Denmark in the level of attachment to the European Union. Finally, while . 
the visibility of the EU is high (the Commission) or very high (the European Court of Justice), it 
is notable that the level of knowledge concerning the European Union is lower in the UK than in 
any other member state. 
The values in Italy are in many ways in sharp contrast to those in the UK. Starting with social 
indicators, Italy displays a largely traditional profile. The percentage of children born outside 
marriage is the lowest in the EU next to Greece (8% ), and the rate of abortion is firmly below 
that of Sweden, Denmark, the UK and France (though above, for example, Germany and the 
Netherlands). With respect to household composition, it is notable that the rate of couples with 
children in Italy is among the highest in the Union, only slightly lower than that of Spain, 
Portugal, Greece and Ireland. Lone-parent households rate somewhat above the EU-average, 
while one-person households are considerable less frequent than the EU-average, although not 
as low as in other south European member states. The extremely low level of non-nationals in 
the population (I. I%, the same as Finland and the lowest in the EU) is also a distinguishing trait 
of Italian society. In economic terms, the Italian profile is neither clearly modem nor exactly 
traditional, but contains elements of both. Obviously, this partly reflects the internal differences 
between the various Italian regions. While GDP per capita in I996 was slightly above the EU 
average (and above that of, for example, the UK, the Netherlands, and Sweden), the number of 
main telephone lines per I 00 inhabitants is below and the number of personal computer is far 
below. Similarly, while Italy belongs to the southern cluster in terms of consumption patterns, 
the production structure largely conforms to the EU average. 
In terms of general societal values, Italy tends to be situated at one or the other of the extremes. 
Of the ten EU member states included in the European Values study, Italy is one of the 
countries with the lowest percentage of the population expressing post-material values (63% ). It 
should be noted, however, that Italy has converged substantially towards the EU average in 
terms of post-modem values since 1981, when it had the lowest value of all EU countries in the 
survey (18% ). Italians are also the people in the EU who trust each other the least. While 69% 
of the population express trust in fellow countrymen, as many as 28% distrust' other Italians. But 
for the Greek, Italians are also the people the least trusted by other Europeans. 50% of all EU 
citizens declare trust for Italians, while 41 % express distrust. Moreover, very few Italians would 
describe themselves as very happy with the life they are leading (12%, the third lowest figure in 
the EU). While Italians are as interested in politics as Europeans in general, they are, however, 
less satisfied than any other member state population with the way democracy works as 73% of 
the population express dissatisfaction with the way the democratic system works in Italy. This 
dissatisfaction is also reflected in the lack of trust for the national government and parliament, 
which is the lowest in the EU (27% and 29% expressing trust for the respective institutions). On 
the contrary, however, the European institutions enjoy a higher-than-average trust from Italians 
compared to other Europeans. 
Italians are as positively disposed towards European integration as they are dissatisfied with the 
Italian political system. In no other EU member state is the support for Union membership as 
high as in Italy (75% consider it a good thing and only 4% a bad thing). Likewise, 81 % of all 
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Italians would to stay in the EU if a referendum were held "tomorrow", the third highest figure 
after those of Ireland and the Netherlands. But, the Italian Euro-enthusiasm is not necessarily 
based on the perceived benefits from EU membership. Only slightly more than the average 
European do Italians perceive their country to have benefited from EU membership, and do they 
regard the single European market a hope rather than a fear. Italians are extremely positive 
towards a continued transfer of competencies to the European level. The only issue where Italy 
would prefer national level decision-making is health and social welfare (and even there the 
ratio is 49% versus 46%), i.e. not in areas such as education, cultural policy, or workers' rights. 
With respect to the political dimension of integration, Italians are firmly positive, though the 
degree depends on the question posed. On the question of whether the further construction of 
Europe requires a democratic European government, Italians are the most positive of all (70% 
respond in the affinnative and only 12% doubt the need for a European government). If the 
question is phrased in terms of the desirability of an evolution towards federalism, Italy still 
occupies a position among the most enthusiastic, but is neither more nor less positive than the 
other founding members in general. Similarly, Italy is the least positive among the original six 
as regards the question of whether those countries in favour of a federal structure should be 
allowed to go ahead amongst themselves, thus contributing to a two-speed Europe. By contrast, 
Italians are the EU population feeling the most European. As many as 30% consider themselves 
citizens of the European Union rather than citizens of Italy or their respective regions. When 
phrased in terms of attachment to the EU, Italy is second to Luxembourg with 58% of the 
population feeling attached to the European Union, while 37% answer in the negative. While the 
knowledge in Italy about the European Union largely conforms to the EU average, it is notable 
that Italy is the member state where the visibility of the EU in the media is the lowest, 
regardless of whether the institution in question is the European Commission, the European 
Court of Justice, or the Council of Ministers 
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5. Conclusion 
This report has shown that the 15 EU member states are experiencing a gradual transformation 
into post-modern societies. Despite the similarity between the European countries, as far as the 
direction of change is concerned, important national differences persist in societal 
structures/behaviour and in the degree of adherence to post-modern values. 
The analysis into societal change isolated a number of trends of which the most important is the 
rapid change in the southern European countries towards a more post-modern expression of 
social behaviour. On the other hand, there is still a marked difference between societal post-
modern patterns in the EU member states, where the Nordic countries seem the most post-
modern by far, while the southern European countries, and to some extent Ireland, are still some 
way off from adopting a post-modern societal structure. The remaining member states are 
showing both post-modern and modern societal traits, as some of them still appear rather 
traditional like Luxembourg or Austria, while in others, like the Netherlands, France or 
Germany clear expressions of post-modernism co-exist with more traditional societal structures. 
The European Values Stqdy of 1991 re-confirmed the traditional north-south divide between the 
more traditional societies in southern Europe and the post-modern societies in northern Europe. 
However, some interesting observations should be added which qualify this rather stereotype,d 
image of Europe: ( 1) The difference in values is from a general point of view more significant 
between generations than between nations, i.e. the rate of young people throughout Europe 
adhering to modern values is likely to be higher than the relative rate of people within an 
individual country that has adopted post-modern values; and (2) There has been a rapid progress 
in the poorer member states both concerning their economic development and popular 
adherence to post-modern values. This trend is very strong in Ireland, which has experienced an 
impressive growth in national GDP per capita expressed in terms of EU PPS and in a parallel 
process the rate of the population expressing adherence to post-modern values has risen 
substantially (European Values Survey). In the case of Spain, a gradual restructuring of the 
economy can be observed in the composition of employment per sector. In the 1990s. the trend 
of employment in the service sector has been positive while it has been negative in the 
agricultural and industrial sectors. Concerning the popular expression of adherence to post-
modern values in Spain, the trend points towards a substantial rise between 1981 and 1990. Italy 
has also experienced a similar development with a very strong rise in popular adherence to post-
modern values between 1981 and 1990. For Greece and Portugal the socio-economic indicators 
show a significant development, but because of the absence of comparable surveys, no firm 
conclusions can be drawn as to the development of the adherence to post-modem values. Given 
the development in Spairi and Ireland, we may however expect that the post-modem value trend 
in Greece and Portugal will be taking a similar direction, and that the trend wilJ be strongest 
among the young and in urban areas; (3) As the generalised trend towards post-modem values 
looks set to progress further, some European champions will gradually be caught up by other 
countries. We should therefore expect that the public expression of value change is becoming 
part of the European citizens' daily lives. Some of these values are being translated into 
demands for new policy directions or into a more diffuse public discontent with the existing 
structures, policies or procedures. 
The analysis of European value patterns and attitudes to European integration grouped together 
some countries with either similar socio-economic characteristics and/or similar attitudes to 
European integration {apart from the last group - the UK and Italy - for which the aim was to 
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illustrate two countries with opposing national characteristics). The groups are, however, far 
from homogeneous. The one displaying the most homogeneous characteristics is the Nordic one 
with a high level of similarity both in terms of socio-economic indicators and popular attitudes 
on European integration. The other groups show a varying degree of similarities and 
differences, but still the countries within the groups are more similar between them than 
between countries in other groups (again with the exception of the last group). Although it is 
extremely difficult to prove that any indicator would be determining a given country's attitude 
to European integration, it seems that the following indicators are almost always present in 
those countries expressing high support for the EU: (I) a strong feeling that the country has 
benefited from EU membership; (2) high hopes that the country wil1 benefit from further 
European integration, for example through the Internal Market; and (3) a feeling of attachment 
to the EU or European integration. Two additional well-known observations may be added: the 
support for EU membership is higher among the initial six member states than among the 
others, and membership in its economic dimension receives high popular support in the poorer 
member states which, in most cases, also accord a quite strong support to political integration. 
There is however no clear-cut corroboration between the degree of post-modern values in a 
country and the population's attitude to European integration. It would be tempting to explain 
Denmark's sceptical attitude to the EU in terms of typical post-modem criticism of the EU (the 
democratic deficit, too much driven by economic considerations etc). This type of criticism may 
go a quite long way in explaining the Danish attitude, but is contradicted by the case of the 
Netherlands where post-modem values find a high expression and the population is amongst the 
most supportive to European integration in the EU. The same argument could be made in the 
opposite case looking at Greece and Portugal where the post-modernism is not so advanced and 
the attitudes to the EU is favourable concerning the economic integration, but quite negative 
concerning political integration. Clearly, culture, historical experience and traditions as well as 
the way in which Europ~an issues are fed into national political and societal discourse play a 
great role in the formation of attitudes to European integration. The groups are useful, however, 
in creating a sort of mental picture about the level of socio-economic development, degree of 
modernisation iri terms of societal values and attitudes to European integration. 
Nor may we conclude that the transformation of socio-economic structures pushes all facets of a 
particular country in the same, post-modem, direction. Socio-economic changes enhance the 
possibilities of some societal groups, while challenging the established ways of life of others. 
This differentiated impact on the population at large is translated into a value pattern of some 
heterogeneity and contradiction, where post-modem priorities such as environmental protection 
and equal treatment exist next to modem fears such as economic crisis and unemployment. 
. These reservations should not, however, stop us from considering the impact that the change 
towards post-modem values may have on popular attitudes towards the EU and the process of 
integration throughout the Union. 
• The time of the European population's permissive consensus to European integration is 
most likely over. The analysis shows a quite generalised dissatisfaction with the way in 
which the democratic system works both on national and European level. Demands for 
amending the 'democratic deficit' of the Union have been heard since some time. Popular 
demands for more participation in the European system are likely to grow louder - a 
challenge to which the Union will have to respond or else a deeper degree of detachment 
between the EU and the European citizens is likely to be result. 
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• Given the post-modern society's emphasis of security values, rejection of all forms of 
authority and the diminishing prestige of science, technology and rationality, the Union 
will be asked with increased intensity to take action in the fields of environmental 
protection, fight against social exclusion, consumer protection and in various areas linked 
to soft security (immigration, organised crime etc.). This is illustrat_ed by the response of 
Europeans to the question of what should be given priority in the EU over the next ten 
years, where the top areas are the fight against organised crime, against drug trafficking, 
against Cancer/ AIDS, against unemployment, and to protect the environment. At the 
bottom of the list, we find a European army, protection of European cultures, and 
protection from non-EU competition. An interesting phenomenon in this context is the 
awareness that many of our contemporary problems know no frontiers (the effects of 
globalisation, the spread of organised crime or environmental degradation to mention a 
few). The national debate in many EU member states is conducted on a basis which 
recognises the incapacity of individual countries to deal effectively with contemporary 
problems on their own. With a border-free Europe in the offing, the European level may 
become the instance towards which people look towards for a solution to their problems. 
The European level may be expected to take gradually the form of a forum where the 
definition of contemporary problems are debated and where national actors compare the 
result of national action. The dimension of sharing the diagnosis of common problems is 
not enough, however, since the definition of problems and their causes feed expectation 
as to effective action to resolve them or at least alleviate their impact. 
• If this analysis is accepted as one possible outcome from a European-wide transformation 
into post-modernism, then it follows that the stimulation of a gradual emergence of a 
popular perception of being able to influence the policy-formation process in the EU 
becomes vital. Succeeding in stimulating a feeling of having a stake in the integration 
process is dependent on a general feeling of belonging to Europe, i.e. that the individual 
citizen feels some sort of emotional attachment to the Union which then in his eyes may 
gradually evolve into an imagined community. The national arena for political discourse 
is one forum in which such a feeling could be stimulated with national opinion-makers 
(political parties, journalists etc.) acting as conveyors. The national arena should not 
function in isolation but should be stimulated by debate in other national arenas so as a 
European-wide debate gradually emerges. Another forum is the national elite which its 
capacity to feed images of co-operation versus competition on the European level to the 
national public opinion. 
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6. Statistical Appendix 
Table 1 : Population by nationality in 1994 
Non-national 
National Non-national EU EUROPE non Rest of the world 
EU 
EUR15 95,3 4,7 1,5 1,6 1,6 
B 90,9 9,1 5,4 1,1 2,6 
DK 96,4 3,6 0,8 1,4 1,4 
D 91,5 8,5 2,2 4,8 1,5 
EL 98,6 1,4 0,4 0,4 0,6 
E 98,9 1,1 075 0,1 0,5 
F 93,7 6,3 2,3 016 3,4 
IRL 97,4 2,2 2 0 0,2 
I 98,9 1,1 0,2 012 0,7 
L 68,2 31,8 28,8 0 3 
NL 94,9 5,1 1,3 1,6 2,2 
A 91,2 8,8 
p 98,4 1,6 0,4 0 1,2 
FIN 98,9 1,1 0,2 0,6 0,3 
s 94,2 5,8 2,1 1,7 2 
UK 96,5 3,5 1,4 0,3 1,8 
Source: Eurostat, Demography in figures 1997 
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Table 2 : Percentage of private household by type of household 
Couples Couples with Lone parent One-person Multi-person 
without children families households households 
children 
E 18,9 53,5 8,1 518 
p 22,7 49,9 6,8 13,8 218 
L 21,2 38A 7,9 25,5 515 
GR 23,8 49,1 6 16,2 4,9 
I 19A 46,7 8,5 20,6 3, 1 
IRL 13,7 47,9 10,6 20,2 6,9 
B 22,9 35,7 9,2 28A 3 
EUR15 23,4 3713 7A 3,8 
UK 2712 32,9 9 26,7 3,3 
A 21,9 35,3 8, 1 29,7 2,7 
F 24,7 3811 7A 27 2,1 
NL 22,5 33,5 6,3 30 7,7 
D 23,3 30,5 6,3 3316 4 
FIN 30,6 26,2 4,1 31,7 6,2 
DK 26,6 26,3 5,8 34,4 3,8 
s 32,2 19,9 3, 1 39,6 5,2 
Source: Eurostat, Population, households and dwellings in Europe, 1996. Figures from the 
1990/91 censuses 
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Table 3 : Rate of infant mortality between 1960 and 1995 
1970 1975 1980 1985 
Greece 29,6 24 17,9 14, 1 
Portuaal 55 5 38,9 24,3 17 8 
Ireland 19,5 17,5 11, 1 8,8 
Italy 29,6 21,2 14,6 10,5 
United Kingdom 18,5 16, 1 12, 1 9,3 
Belgium 21, 1 16, 1 12, 1 9,8 
EUR15 23,4 18 1 12,4 95 
Spain 28,1 18,9 12 3 8,9 
Luxembourg 24,9 14,8 11,5 9 
Netherlands 12,7 10,6 8,6 8 
Austria 25,9 20,5 14,3 11,2 
Germany 22,5 18,9 12,4 9, 1 
Denmark 14 2 10,4 8,4 7,9 
France 18,2 13 8 10 8,3 
Sweden 11 8,6 69 6,8 
Finland 13,2 10 7,6 6,3 
Infant mortality per 1 OOO live births. 
Source: New Cronos, Eurostat 
Infant mortality between 1985 and 1995 
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Table 4: Percentage of births outside marriage 
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
Greece 1,1 1,3 1,5 1,8 2,2 2,4 2,6 2,8 2,9 3 3, 1 
Italy 2,2 2,6 4,3 5,4 615 6,7 6,7 7,4 718 8 8, 1 
Spain 1,4 2 3,9 8 9,6 10 1015 10,8 10,8 10,8 
Luxembourg 4 4,2 6 8,7 12,8 12,2 12,7 12,9 12,7 13,1 15 
Belgium 218 3, 1 4,1 7, 1 11,6 12,6 13,6 14, 1 14,5 15 
Netherlands 2, 1 2,1 4,1 8,3 11,4 12 12,4 13, 1 14,3 15,5 16,9 
Germany 7,2 8,5 11 ,9 16,2 15,3 15, 1 14,9 14,8 15,4 16, 1 16,8 
Portugal 7,3 7,2 9,2 12,3 14,7 15,6 16, 1 17 17,8 18,7 17, 1 
Ireland 2,7 3,7 5 8,5 14,6 16,9 18,2 20 21,2 22,7 24,8 
EUR15 5,6 6,8 9,6 14,9 19,6 20,5 21,1 21,8 22,5 23,3 
Austria 12,8 13,5 17,8 22,4 23,6 24,8 25,2 26,3 26,8 27,4 28 
Finland 5,8 10, 1 13, 1 16,4 25,2 27,4 28,9 30,3 31,3 33,1 35,4 
United 8 9 11 ,5 18,9 27,9 29,8 30,8 .31,8 32 33,6 
Kingdom 
France 6,9 8,5 11,4 19,6 30,1 31,8 33,2 34,9 36,1 37,2 
Denmark 11 21,7 33,2 43 46,4 46,5 46,4 46,8 46,9 46,5 
Sweden 18,6 32,8 39,7 46,4 47 48,2 49,5 50,4 51,6 53 67,5 
Source: New Cronos, Eurostat 
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Table 5 : Mean age of women at birth of first child 
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
EUR15 
Portugal 24,4 24 23,6 23,8 24,7 24,9 25 25,2 25,4 25,6 
Austria 25 25,1 25,3 25,5 25,9 
Greece 24 23,6 23,3 23,7 24,7 25 25,4 25,9 26 26,4 
Belgium 24 24,1 24,6 24,9 26,5 26,6 
Luxembourg 26,5 26,8 
Ireland 25,3 24,8 24,9 25,6 26,3 26,3 26,4 26,6 26,8 27 
France 23,8 24,2 24,9 25,9 27 27,2 
Spain 24,5 24,6 25,4 26,5 26,9 27,2 27,1 
Sweden 24,5 25,5 26,1 26,3 26,5 26,7 27 27,2 27,3 
Denmark 23} 24 24,6 25,5 26,4 26,8 26,9 27,2 27,3 27,5 
Italy 25,1 24,7 25,1 25,9 26,9 27,4 27,5 
Finland 26,8 26,4 27 27,2 27,3 27,6 
United 23,9 24,6 25,1 25,9 27,3 27,4 27,7 27,4 27,3 
Kingdom 
Germany 26,9 27,2 27,5 27,8 28,1 
Netherlands 24,3 25 25,6 26,5 27,6 27,8 28 28,3 28,4 28,6 
Source: New Cronos, Eurostat 
Mean age of women at birth of first child 
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Table 6 : Number of abortions per 1 OOO women 
Sweden Denmark. United France Italy Finland Gennany Netherlands Greece Spain 
Kingdom 
1975 7,90 10,92 5,09 - - - - - -
1980 8,32 8,99 5,84 6,21 7,17 6,09 4,38 2,99 - -
1985 7,30 7,68 6,23 6,12 7,22 5,47 4,28 2,36 - -
1990 8,66 7,90 6,70 5,85 5,53 4,77 3,54 2,43 1,97 1,88 
1993 7,75 7,07 6,05 5,34 4,93 3,97 2,66 2,56 2,34 2,28 
Source: New Cronos, Eurostat 
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Table 7 : Percentage of unmarried women by age 
15-19 20-24 25-29 36-34 35--39 4044 45-49 
Belgun 97,83 75,55 34,7 17,76 10,72 7,21 5,28 
Gemlll1y 00,00 82,95 47,45 21,65 12,12 8,05 5,46 
M:!lherlams 98,88 83,61 49,91 25,14 14,85 9,38 6,1 
Ireland 98,45 92,62 52,03 22,24 13,02 10,31 8,04 
FralEe 98,95 89,29 52,95 29,77 17,76 11,9 8,44 
t«wv.ay 99,1 00,73 59,41 32,51 17,88 10,12 6,59 
Det11ark 99,1 89,93 62,79 35,59 22,99 14,00 7,44 
9J\eder1 99,2 91,46 00,81 42,64 28,83 19,83 13,23 
Anand 99,43 83,35 ffi,00 33,43 21,77 15,00 10,74 
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Table 8 : Percentage of unmarried men by age 
15-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 50-54 55-59 
Belgium 99,43 91,45 53,08 28,18 16,93 11,3 8,63 7,3 7,2 
Denmark 99,7 95,88 78,54 50,57 34,93 23,4 14, 11 9,2 8 
Germany 98,35 95,76 68,82 36,72 20,69 13,79 9,6 8,8 6,8 
France 99,29 97,21 68,34 40,39 24,57 15,82 10,5 8,8 9,3 
Ireland 98,21 96,93 67,43 32,71 18,44 14,5 13,9 15 17 
Netherlands 99,7 97,51 49,12 38, 16 22,93 14,74 9,6 7,3 7 
Finland 99,9 93,74 72,09 46,75 32,31 23,12 16 11,9 12,4 
Sweden 99,9 97,53 81,8 56,82 40,48 28,93 20,8 14 11,3 
Norway 99,8 97,81 76,87 48, 19 29,03 17,35 11,5 8,9 8,8 
Percentage of unmarried men by age 
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Table 9: Pattern of consumption (in per cent) 
FURNITURE, RECREATION, 
FOOD, FURNISHING MBJICAL TRANSPORT 8\ITERTAINM QOTHING GROSS AND 8'JT, MISC8.LANE OTHER BEVERAGES AND R8'JT, FUEL HOUSB-JOLD O\REAND AND ECUCATION OUSGOODS EXPB\JDfTURE AND HEJ\LTH COMMUN la\ AND 
TOBAcm FOOTWEAR ANDPOV'vm EQUIPMENT EXPB\JSES AND SERVICES N.EC. AND TION aJLTURAL 
OPffiATION Sffiv'ICES 
Belgium 19,06 6,22 24,86 6,99 4,30 12,03 6,01 15,17 5,32 
Denmark 17,94 4,75 30,03 5,23 1,91 15,96 7,85 11,62 4,70 
Germany 19,23 7,29 21,01 7,80 4,69 14,46 8,82 4,30 12,38 
Greece 26,11 12,45 20,74 7,89 4,62 10,13 5,47 11,42 1,18 
Spain 29,14 10,68 19,67 6,43 2,38 12,49 5,52 10.72 2,92 
France 17,16 5,56 29,16 7.41 5,34 15,70 5,62 8,75 6,30 
Ireland 25,29 6,73 15.73 5,20 2,61 12,50 7,89 13,65 10,40 
Italy 25,98 9,37 19,88 7,70 2,20 15,86 6,11 9,11 3,79 
Luxembourg 17,36 7,80 25,56 8,63 4,32 12,21 7,64 13,33 3,14 
Netherlands 15,57 1,73 22,20 6,41 2,35 8,23 9,33 10,55 9,58 
Portugal 36,05 8,72 14,16 7,13 3,21 14,31 3,28 10,76 2,38 
United Kingdom 17,97 6,62 26,07 5,64 1, 11 10,51 7,88 17,86 6,32 
Source: New Cronos 97, Eurostat 
DI FOOD, BEVERAGES A i'D TOBACCO 
I CLOTHING AND FOOlWEAR 
0 GF\DSS RENT, FU3_ AND RJ\f\Jffi 
0 FURNTURE, FURNSHll\G AND HOUS&!OLD EQUPMB\JT Ai'D OPCRA. TION 
• MEDO\L CAREANJ t-EAL TH 8<P8\SES 
0 TRANSRJRT AND CDMMUNICA TION 
I] RECRfATIOI\( ENTERTAINMB\JT, 13JLCATJONANDQJLTLRAL SER\/ICES 
0 MISCB...LANB:lUS GOODS AND SERVICES 
• 011-ffi EXA3\JDTLRE N. EC. 
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Tableau 1 O : Distance between consumption profiles 
B:tjun Omak Ran? l1Jeltnrg ~ <3eem ~ lay lr8n:1 ~ G!'mry -~--~ l 
BVrn QCD 035 0,32 0,15 1,L9 0,78 Qffi 0,53 0,62 Q31 112 0,19 
D:mak QJ5 O,CD Q34 0,42 181 1,35 0,95 0,63 Q93 QZ9 1,2) QBJ 
Rate 032 034 OCD Q4) 175 1.23 1 Cl3 Q72 1 CB Q87 Qffi 093 
Luertxug Q15 0,42 Q4J QCO 1,:E Qffi 0,64 o,si 1,01 Q9J 1,22 107 
~ 1 L9 181 175 1,J3 QCD 0,61 0,3) 0,41 1,11 1,9J 211 2,62 
Qe:e 078 135 1.23 095 061 OCD 0:::5 041 131 131 182 217 
~ Qffi QS6 1 Cl3 0,64 0,3) Q,25 QCD 012 0,75 0,95 1,43 1,19 
lay Q!:B 063 0,72 o,si 0,47 0,47 0,12 QOO 0,67 0,91 1,CD 1,53 
lraa-d 062 093 1 CB 101 111 131 0,75 067 am Q63 Qffi 083 
LK 031 OZ9 087 QS) 19J 131 Q95 091 Qffi QCD 157 Q?.5 
CBmry 1.12 12:1 063 1,22 211 182 1,43 1 co Qffi 157 QCD 1,C5 
N:tte1crt6 079 08) 093 107 262 717 179 153 Qffi 075 HE OCO 
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Table 11 : Consumption of food in percentage of total consumption 
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
I I 
EUR 15 16 8 16 4 15 9 15 3 1 5 1 15 14 6 
8 17 9 17 7 17 16,5 15 8 15 5 15 3 14 5 1 4 13 4 
DK 16 15 4 15 15.2 15 3 14 8 14 8 15 14 6 1 4 1 
D 1 3 1 12 9 12 6 12 3 12.4 12 2 11 8 11 4 11 1 0 6 
EL 32 9 32 3 31 9 30 8 31 1 30 3 29 6 28 4 28 3 
E 21 5 21 3 20 2 19 2 18 7 18 5 17 7 15 2 
F 16 8 16 6 16 2 15 9 15 6 15 4 15 2 14 7 14 4 14.1 
IRL 22 6 20 6 20 6 19 4 19 4 18 6 18 6 18 6 1 8 4 17 3 
I 21.5 20 7 19 8 18 8 18 3 17 8 17 4 17 1 1 7 1 16 6 
L 14 9 14 5 13 6 13 12 2 11 9 1 a 9 
NL 12 9 12 6 12 4 12 3 12 2 11 9 11 6 11 5 11 2 11 1 
A 17 16 7 16 4 15 9 15 5 15 4 15 2 14 9 14.7 14 1 
p 33 27 7 27 4 25 6 25 2 25 2 23 6 
FIN 19 6 19 3 1 8 3 17 4 16 6 16 2 16 3 16.3 16 15.7 
s 18 2 1 8 17 2 16 7 16 4 16 1 15 1 14 3 14 4 
UK 13 5 1 3 12 4 11 7 11 4 11 4 11 5 11 3 1 0 9 10 6 
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Table 12 : Percentage of households having a car, 1994 
have a car cannot afford a car 
B 77 7 
DK 59 16 
D 74 4 
EL 56 24 
E 68 16 
F 78 7 
IRL 65 18 
I 77 4 
L 83 4 
NL 59 7 
p 55 28 
UK 69 12 
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Cl have a car 
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Table 13 : Percentage of young between 16 and 18 years old enrolled in schools and 
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Table 15: Employment by sector in 1991 
Ag ri culture lndustrie Services 
BELGIQUE 98 1051 2537 
DANEMARK 149 724 1713 
ALLEMAGNE 957 11190 16386 
GRECE 
ESPAGNE 1345 4168 7095 
FRANCE 1257 6424 14106 
IRLANDE 154 322 633 
ITALIE 1823 12672 
LUXEMBOURG 
PAYS-BAS 293 1645 4459 
PORTUGAL 799 1600 2207 
GREAT BRITAIN 567 7147 17222 
AUTRICHE 256 1284 1923 
FINLANDE 198 682 1448 
SUEDE 143 1250 3031 
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Table 16 : Employment by sector in 1994 
Agriculture lndustrie Services 
BELGIQUE 108 1082 2558 
DANE MARK 127 670 1728 
ALLEMAGNE 1171 13261 21408 
GRECE 788 894 2104 
ESPAGNE 1164 3530 7034 
FRANCE 1128 5830 14750 
IRLANDE 151 335 716 
ITALIE 1550 6429 12045 
LUXEMBOURG 5 44 114 
PAYS-BAS 262 1532 4769 
PORTUGAL 522 1442 2476 
GREAT BRITAIN 534 7087 17890 
AUTRICHE 266 1236 2206 
FINLANDE 171 541 1326 
SUEDE 139 980 2817 
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Table 17 : Percentage of employment by sector in 1991 
Agriculture lndustrie Services 
BELGIQUE 2,66 28,51 68,83 
DANE MARK 5,76 28,00 66,24 
ALLEMAGNE 3,35 39,22 57,43 
GRECE 
ESPAGNE 10,67 33,06 56,27 
FRANCE 5,77 29,49 64,75 
IRLANDE 13,89 29,04 57,08 
ITALIE 
LUXEMBOURG 
PAYS-BAS 4,58 25,72 69,70 
PORTUGAL 17,35 34,74 47,92 
GREAT BRITAIN 2,27 28,66 69,06 
AUTRICHE 7,39 37,08 55,53 
FINLANDE 8,51 29,30 62,20 
SUEDE 3,23 28,25 68,51 
Percentage of employment by sector in 1991 rJ Agriculture • lndustrie D Services 
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.. 
Table 18 : Percentage of employment by sector in 1994 
Agriculture lndustrie Services 
BELGIQUE 3,00 29,00 68,00 
DANE MARK 5,00 26,00 68100 
ALLEMAGNE 3,00 37100 60,00 
GRECE 21,00 24,00 56,00 
ESPAGNE 10100 30,00 60,00 
FRANCE 5,00 27,00 68,00 
IRLANDE 13,00 28,00 59,00 
ITALIE 8,00 32,00 60,00 
LUXEMBOURG 3,00 27,00 70,00 
PAYS-BAS 4,00 23,00 71,00 
PORTUGAL 12,00 32,00 56,00 
GREAT BRITAIN 2,00 28,00 70,00 
AUTRICHE 7,00 33,00 59,00 
FIN LANDE 8,00 27,00 65,00 
SUEDE 4,00 25,00 72,00 
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Table 19 : Main telephone lines1 in operation per 100 inhabitants 
1994 1990 1985 1980 
United-Kinadom 48 55 4413 38 20 31 42 
Sweden 67 96 68.34 62 78 58.00 
Soain 37 51 32.44 24.31 19.34 
Portuaal 34 78 24 04 13 99 10 13 
Netherlands 50 90 4642 4018 34 57 
Luxembura 54 96 48 11 42 04 3625 
ltalv 42 90 39 40 30 74 23 07 
Ireland 34 61 2804 19 86 14 20 
Greece 47.73 38 86 31 37 23 55 
Germanv 47 65 4019 32 69 2622 
France 54 58 49 50 41 66 29 51 
Finland 55.05 53 55 44.65 36.38 
Denmark 60.00 5664 49 73 43.45 
Belaium 44 75 39 25 31 05 25 01 
Austria 45 85 41 70 36 02 2902 
EUR-15 47.38 42,07 34.50 27.19 
Source: ITU, EUROSTAT, OECD, Communication indicators for major economies. 
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1 A main line is a telephone line connecting the subscriber's terminal equipment (telephone set, facsimile machine) 
to the public switched network and which has a dedicated port in telephone exchange. 
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Table 20 : Personal computers per 100 inhabitants 
1994 1993 1992 1991 1990 
EUR15 11 00 9 69 866 7 46 644 
Austria 10 59 926 8.21 7.04 6.21 
Belaium 13 84 12.49 11.15 10 00 8.83 
Denmark 21 13 17 92 15 47 13 39 11 48 
Finland 15 72 14 21 12 89 11 37 10 03 
France 1010 924 8.47 7.90 7.28 
Germanv 12 96 11 60 10 45 8 88 7 86 
Greece 2 88 260 2.23 1 95 1 77 
Ireland 13.96 12 88 12 10 11.35 10.55 
ltalv 7.20 6.14 5.45 4.58 3.70 
Luxemboura 
Netherlands 15 60 13 67 14 69 12 94 11.30 
Portuaal 3.53 3.24 3.04 2 84 263 
Soain 7 02 614 510 3 96 2 91 
Sweden 18.79 16 75 14.88 13 11 11 57 
United Kinadom 14.04 11.93 9 98 8,27 6.88 
Source: ITU, EUROSTAT1 OECD, Communication indicators for major economies. 
Personal computers per 100 inhabitants 
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